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Abstract 
 
Bank consolidations have globally affected banking firms’ market structures. Whenever market structures 
change, both the consolidating and non-involved performances in the local banking market could be co-impacted 
in the same or different direction at different degrees. Taking evidence from Nigeria changing market structures, 
we examined how banks and other micro financial institutions concurrently respond in terms of lending to 
changes in market structures. To have achieved this, we purposively sampled 845 financial institutions, which 
comprised 24 commercial banks and 821 Micro-Finance Banks (MFBs). We made use of secondary data, which 
were collected between 2001 and 2010 from the Central Bank of Nigeria Data Base. We analyzed the data by 
multivariate regression analysis method. The result shows that fall in bank loans to small businesses (β= - 0.817) 
due to changes in bank size of merged commercial banks positively affected microfinance bank lending (β = 
0.955, p-value= 0.086). MFBs increase their loans to small businesses by 0.955% for every 0.817% fall in 
banks’ loans. Dynamic changes in bank equity affected commercial banks’ and MFBs propensities to supply 
loans to small businesses negatively (β=- 0.699) and positively (β=0.727) respectively. This means that as 
increment in merged bank equity reduced banks’ credits to small business borrowers by 0.699% significantly (p- 
value=0.023< 0.05), MFBs responded to the shortfall by increasing their loans by 0.727% although 
insignificantly (p-value=0.147>0.05). Moreover, increases in bank deposits negatively but significantly affected 
credits commercial banks supply to small business borrowers (β= - 0.725, p-value= 0.012), but positively 
although insignificantly affected MFBs loan to borrowers (β= 0.776, p-value=0.107) implying that MFBs 
increase their loans by 0.776% for every 0.725% fall in commercial bank loans. Finally, changes in bank market 
share negatively and positively affected commercial banks’ and MFBs propensities to supply small credits (β = - 
0.018) and (β= 0.03) respectively implying that MFBs banks’ increase their loans by 0.03% for every 0.018% 
fall in merged banks’ loan to small credit consumers. On average therefore, credit availability to  small 
businesses has not decreased due to the offsetting lending role of MFBs in the Nigerian banking sector contrary 
to general opinion. We strongly recommended that the maximum lending volume of MFBs should be reviewed 
upward to further strengthen them for this emerging role. 
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1.1 Introductions 
This study is anchored on the evidence we found from Berger et al (1998) and Wolken et al 
(1996) that in a consolidating environment, huge banks could trade-off small loans to small 
banks. For us, this means that the relationship between huge loans and small loans in a 
positively changing market environment could be negative. Considering how significant this 
relationship could be in lending policy effectiveness and the general welfare of small 
businesses, we are challenged that from Nigerian financial sector context, scholars are yet to 
explore substantially the reality of this negative relationship and particularly the roles of small 
banks where market composition is changing due mainly to firm consolidations. This lack no 
doubt constitutes a serious literature gap that needs to be closed. Little wonder, the regulating 
authority have not fully exploited the measures likely to boost the lending effort of small 
banks especially among the developing economies. Our ultimate aim in this paper is therefore 
to take evidence from Nigeria and examine whether changes in market structures actually 
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reduce bank loans to Nigerian small businesses and whether other non-commercial bank 
financial institutions positively or negatively respond to this market dynamism. Specifically, 
we would be providing empirical evidence that fall in banks’ credit to small business 
borrowers could translate into higher or lower propensity of the micro-financial institutions to 
make up the plummeting loans. 
Banking consolidation brings about changes in market structures (Prompitak, 2009), which, 
no doubts, can have marked effects on banking conducts especially as it affects their decision 
to lend. In our context, market structures define the number of playing banks in the market, 
banking sizes in terms of gross assets and equity, bank deposit demands and deposit or asset 
concentration of banking firms. Evidence (see Berger et al, 1998 and Wolken et al, 1996) 
suggests that consolidation, which also affect market structures dynamically decreases banks’ 
propensity to create small risk asset. Therefore, in the course of the changes in lending 
decision behavior, other non commercial-banking institutions according to the researchers 
could respond positively or negatively contemporaneously since they all play in the same 
local markets. Among these non-commercial banking institutions are the Micro-Finance 
Banks (MFBs), which have established themselves in small credit local market. Hence, they 
might react possibly positively towards small loans demand that may be turned down by the 
consolidating banks, given evidence that merged mega banks turn down small credit demand 
for higher business profitable loans and investments. If in reality within the context of 
dynamic market structures, they could fill the gap created by banks’ decreasing loans to small 
business borrowers, they are therefore playing new but unknown roles otherwise referred for 
the purpose of this paper as an emerging risk asset creation or substitution lending role. Our 
ultimate concern is to determine the direction and extent of these roles in a dynamic market 
structures. Berger, et al (1998) referred to this as an external effect of banking consolidation, 
which they defined as the reaction of the other small banks to banking consolidation in the 
local markets. 
Although scholars in Nigeria such as Emeni and Okafor (2008), and Asuquo (2012) had 
anyway attempted to investigate the extent bank consolidation affect external lending to small 
businesses in Nigeria, they concentrated on the static external effect. Unlike the previous 
research, we shall focus on the dynamic effects. The shortcoming in their research can be 
obviously noticed from their cross sectional studies, where cross-sectional data ending in 
2004 were employed in the determination of the effects. From Nigerian banking firm 
consolidation perspective, we can strongly argue that their studies did not capture the real 
substitution effect since actual change in banking firms’ market structures for which they used 
as a reference point kicked off between 2005 and 2006. In addition, we can also argue that 
even if they have a defense based on the nature of their data, their studies could only capture 
the static or short-run substitution effect, which would be a period too short for a meaningful 
effect to surface to inform a useful economic decision. This is especially since according to 
Berger et al (1998), external effect that follows from corporate restructuring surfaces fully in 
the third year of the consolidations. This implies that the minimum post-consolidation period 
for dynamic external effects to fully surface is 3 years, which according to Focarelli and 
Panetta, (2003) is because there is always a delay in adjustment relating to efficiency. The 
restructuring and external effects begin after mergers and acquisitions and may take several 
years to complete according to Berger et al (1998) since it may take time to restructure the 
consolidated institutions’ portfolio by divesting assets, or to change its lending priority or 
focus by promulgating revised lending policies and procedures. Consideration for time 
dimension is a sine qua non for capturing the holistic effects of changes in banking market 
structures on lending decision. Toevs (1992), as shown in Prompitak (2009) allowed a five- 
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year post-consolidation gestation period to be able to capture dynamic performance changes 
due to consolidation. Tehranian et al (1992) as shown in Prompitak (2009) consider three 
years as a normal emergence of performance effects after mergers and acquisitions and follow 
such a dimension. This study follows this dynamic time dimension and makes much different 
by using a six-year post-consolidation gestation period in examining the extent and the 
direction of the substitution-lending role of MFBs in changing banking market structures. 
However, unlike Berger et al (1998), we employ multivariate models under the framework of 
Monti-Klein model of banking firm moderations. In this case, two dependent variables are 
regressed at the same times such that the contemporaneous effects are detected from the 
command output. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that have 
considered the simultaneous dynamic effect of bank consolidation on bank and micro- 
institutions’ loans to small credit consumers using multivariate approach. We are the first to 
consider the substitution-lending role of MFBs in a dynamic banking firm market structures 
in Nigeria and elsewhere using this model. Using a sample of 845 financial institutions 
comprising 21 commercial banks and 824 MFBs, we report that micro-finance institutions is 
substituting for small risk assets abandoned by opportunistic merged banks that are fishing for 
high profit loans. As banks decrease their loans to small businesses, MFBs reverse the 
scenario by positively adjusting their lending propensity. However, because they are limited 
by capital base and maximum amount of risk assets they can create the off-setting is not total. 
To fix this limitation, we recommend that their capital base should be expanded alongside 
their lending capacity. Because this study has significantly contributed to literatures, its utility 
cannot be overemphasized. It would redirect the apex banks’ lending policies relating to 
micro-credit institutions as banking firms’ market structures dynamically change. This would 
particularly affect those in developing and emerging economies where lending policies have 
been counter-productive. 
Therefore, based on the extant literature postulation that external effect seems to be quite 
strong and positive, offsetting much if not all of the reductions in supply of small business 
lending by the consolidating institutions, we make the following postulations. We specifically 
argue that these other banks such as Micro-Finance banks, according to extant literatures may 
pick up profitable loans that are dropped by merging institutions thereby substituting the 
former roles of banks in this perspective. Most likely, MFBs could have a dynamic reaction 
that increases their small business supply. From these fundamentals, we postulate to test the 
reality of the expected behavior of micro-financial institutions using consolidation metrics 
such as bank sizes, bank financial characteristics and competitive position. 
H1: Dynamically changing banking firms’ size and consequential fall in their small risk asset 
creation propensity do not significantly increase microfinance institution loans supply. 
H2: Changing banking firms’ financial characteristic in terms of equity condition  reduces 
their credit supply to small businesses but do not significantly increase micro-finance 
institutions’ ability to create additional risk assets to meet the shortfall. 
H3: Fall in commercial bank loans to small businesses due to changes in bank deposits of 
merged banks does not bring about significant increase in microfinance institutions loans. 
H4: Fall in commercial bank loans to small businesses due to changes in bank market shares 
of merged banks does not bring about significant increase in microfinance institutions loans. 
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 Review of Related Literature 
In the review of the related literature, we shall first examine the conceptual framework as it 
affects consolidation, which is the ultimate driver of the changes in market structure. In the 
course of this, we shall also define what market structure means in the context of this study. 
After the conceptual framework, we shall discuss the theoretical foundations of this paper in 
the light of Structure –Conduct-Performance Theory and The Monti- Klein Theory of banking 
firm. Briefly, we shall review empirical work on bank lending to small businesses. 
 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
According to Prompitak, (2009) banks change their lending decision as market structures 
change. Market structure defines the number of participants in the market. Decision among 
the players can therefore change as the number of players fluctuates. Banks in Nigerian have 
been under the influence of market structure changes. Prior to 2005, there were about 89 
banks. However, between 2005 and 2006, the market structure changed as banks reduced to 
24. No doubts this had impact on banks’ conduct and performance, which includes lending 
activities. This brings us to the theory and concept of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP). 
The SCP as a model of firm behavior is defined as the relationship between market structure, 
firm conduct and firm performance. It defines a tripartite relationship of Market Structure, 
Firm Conduct or Behavior and Firms’ Performance. It opines that the existence of entry 
barriers (prevention of structure change) is the key driver of firm profitability. In this case, as 
the entry cost goes high, the easier for an existing firm to make abnormal monopoly profits 
(Gladys, 2013). A bank, which is enjoying monopoly power, prices its lending product to 
maximize profit and minimize cost as far as possible. These cost minimization and profit 
maximization make the firm rationalize lending. It encourages banks to break their small 
business relationship with less potential for profit and try to maximize profit by establishing 
lending relationship with high borrowers. Therefore, changes in market structures result in 
market concentration, which decreases the cost of collusion between firms. Micro-Finance 
Bank [MFB] means any company licensed to carry on the business of providing micro- 
finance services such as savings, loans, domestic fund transfers and other financial services 
that economically active poor, micro-enterprises and small and medium enterprises need to 
conduct or expand their businesses as defined by these guidelines (A special Bulletin from 
CBN). Micro finance means providing the economically active poor and low income 
households with financial services, such as credit (to help them engage in income generating 
activities or expand/grow their small businesses), savings, micro-leasing, micro-insurance and 
payment transfer. Micro-finance banks are institutions that are established to provide financial 
services to the active poor. Two categories of micro-finance banks are recognized under the 
microfinance policy. They are those MFBs licensed to operate as unit banks and within a local 
government area and MFBs licensed to operate statewide. Their capital bases are respectively 
a minimum of N20million and N1billion. According to Oye (2011), MFB loan is a facility 
granted to an individual or group of borrowers whose principal source of income is derived 
from business activities involving the production or and of goods and services. The maximum 
loan facility to be given to a borrower per time equals N500,000. This policy can be reviewed 
by CBN from time to time. This facility is available to peasant farmers, businesspersons, 
artisans, anglers, senior citizens and non-salaried workers. The problem with these loans is 
that they are unsecured. The tenure of the loan is between 6 months to 12 months. Individuals, 
community development associations, private corporate entities and foreign investors can 
establish MFBs. According to Oye (2011), significant ownership diversification shall be 
encouraged to enhance good corporate governance of licensed MFBs. Regulation demands 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.13, 2015 
www.iiste.org 
197 
 
 
 
that any Universal banks that wish to establish MFBs as subsidiary must meet up the 
prescribed prudential requirements and availability of free funds. 
One of the factors that drive market structure is consolidation. Consolidation is a 
consummation of two or more firm into a single firm. It is a product of mergers and 
acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions in most literatures represent aspect of organizational 
re-composition geared toward effecting strategic management, corporate finance and value 
maximization for investing stakeholders or shareholders in particular. According to extant 
literatures, both, that is, mergers and acquisitions deal with the buying, selling, dividing and 
combining of different companies and similar entities. Fundamentally, the combination helps 
the players grow rapidly in their sector or location of origin, or a new field or new location. 
The unique thing about consolidations is that the activities affect the market structures of 
banks, which in turn affects banks’ behavior. Based on the Structure-Conduct Performance 
Paradigm, and Efficient-Structure Performance Hypothesis of banking consolidation, bank 
mergers and acquisitions affect the way banks behave, and on the other hand, bank 
concentration causes banks to be more efficient through market collusion that would help the 
players extract rents from their borrowing customers. From this scenario, mergers and 
acquisitions activities can be defined as type of restructuring events. This is because the 
activities occur in some corporate organization and result in reorganization that provides 
growth or positive value to investing shareholders. Mergers and acquisitions are closely 
related. In fact, the distinction between the two has become increasingly unclear and variously 
misconceived in various respects particularly in terms of the main economic outcome 
according to scholars. Therefore, although both differ, scholars use the terms loosely to mean 
the same thing. From a legal point of view, according to Wikipedia (2014), a merger is a legal 
consolidation of two companies into one entity, whereas an acquisitions occurs when one 
company takes over another and completely establishes itself as the new owner in which case 
the target company still exist as an independent legal entity controlled by the acquirer. As a 
concept that is quite complex, a merger according to Oye (2011) is the situation where two or 
more companies combine to form a larger business organization. On the other hand, according 
to the scholar, an acquisition involves the purchase of controlling shares in another company. 
In her book, ‘Advanced Financial Accounting’ Ofoegbu, (2003), sees merger as an event that 
takes place where shareholders or business enterprises combine their operations in order to 
achieve mutual sharing of risks and rewards attached to the combined enterprises. Hence, 
considering merger from her own point of view, the ultimate aim of merging in the corporate 
is to diversify for risk removal, reduction or even transfer, which eventually would result in 
value maximization. Control is an essential element in acquisitions. No wonder Nwude (2005) 
defines acquisition as the purchase of controlling interest in one company by  another 
company such that the acquired company becomes a subsidiary or a division of the acquirer. 
Where acquisitions occur between entities according to David, Britton and Ann (2009), the 
acquiring entity obtains control over the action of the entity taken over. This control, 
according to them, gives the acquirer the power to govern the financial and operating policies 
of the acquired, which enables them to obtain benefits from its activities. The term structure 
refers to the number of banks serving in the entire industry. Market structure responds to the 
internal variables such as competitions and regulation as well as to external economic and 
population situations. The term conduct refers to the behavior of the banks in the market. This 
includes pricing, marketing and innovative behavior of the business of banking. The term 
performance refers to the quality and quantity of product and services provided by the banks 
in the industry. SCP models assumes that market structures identified by many  firms 
providing the same product and services though relatively equal in firm size, are   competitive 
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markets generating greater performance. Then the degree of concentration of banks’ output in 
a market affects the extent of competition among banks. This is so because of the assumption 
that a more highly concentrated market structure is more likely to produce more effective 
collusion. In order words,scp model suggests that market concentration lowers the cost of 
collusion between banks and ends in suboptimal profits for all market participants. Market 
structure conduct performance SCP or collusion hypothesis following Bain (1951) claims that 
market structure influences conduct or behavior of firms through pricing and investment 
policies and this in turn translates into performance. 
Changes in market structures also affect banks’ specific characteristics such as equity 
condition, competitive position, portfolio condition, deposit demands and average bank size 
(Berger et al 1998). Equity position of banks is very significant in determining how banks 
behave in terms of maximizing their profit. Going from the traditional theory of capital by 
Klein (1971), the bank is assumed to have a preference ordering over the average rate of 
return on equity, which can be represented by a utility function that is linear. Based on this, 
the decision of the firm is always to optimize expected utility or, equivalently according to the 
scholar, the rate of return on equity. In this framework, bank has two basic sources of funds. 
First, the capital invested in the bank by the owners and second, funds that were obtained by 
the issuance of various types of deposits. Undercapitalization of banks then has effects on 
bank lending behavior. As this increases, banks can decrease or increase their loans to 
particular group borrowers. According to Samolyx and Avery (2000), as market structures 
change because of consolidations, small lending products may not evolve with the system. 
This according to them may change merging banks’ relationship with them. This change in 
relationship is likely going to be negative on bank lending to small businesses. Because the 
number of banks reflects the intensity of competition in the market, we can decipher based on 
the Monti-Klein model, the relationship between competitive position of firms and the loan 
interest rate or loans. That is, as the number of banks in the market increases due to changing 
market structures, or when the market is more competitive, a bank tends to reduce its loan 
price and propensity to lend. This reduction in propensity to lend therefore, can affect credit 
availability to small businesses. In the refined Monti-Klein model, it is assumed that bank can 
suffer from liquidity risk, which occurs when the bank has to make unexpected cash payments 
or when there is an unexpected massive withdrawal of deposits. Increase in firms’ liquidity 
risk can affect their propensity to lend. A bigger bank is likely going  to  absorb higher 
liquidity risk than small banks. Lending to small businesses could mean low liquidity risk 
behavior. However, this may not be sustained when competition is increasing. Liquidity risk 
is defined in the model by the random amount in the volume of deposit withdrawals. If the 
deposit withdrawals are larger than the bank reserve, a liquidity shortage results and the bank 
has to pay some penalty cost for this shortage. Default risk is also another market feature that 
could affect bank lending behavior. Evidence shows that lending to small businesses would 
likely increase the likelihood of banks’ non-performing loans. According to Freixas and 
Rochet (1998), Monti-Klein model has been extended to the case of risky loans. That is to the 
case of default risk where loans may become irrecoverable in the case of complete default. 
 Empirical Review 
Several studies have examined the effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on banking 
behavior. The effects as shown in Prompitak (2009) have been classified into four main 
groups. They include; the effects of bank mergers on deposits rates, the effects of bank 
mergers on risk behavior, the effect of bank mergers on bank market shares and the effects of 
bank mergers on bank loan spread. We shall begin by considering first, the literatures   related 
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to the effects on deposit interest rates. Most of the studies especially those focused on US 
bank mergers find that bank mergers and acquisitions have a negative influence on the deposit 
interest rates of the merged banks. Prager and Hannan (1998) confirmed this in their study. 
According to them, the price effects of bank mergers have substantially increased the 
concentration of a local market. In their examination of the dynamic changes in bank sizes on 
deposit interest rates, they found that mergers occurring in concentrated banking market leads 
to adverse changes in the short-term deposit interest rate. This means that the merged banks 
do not pass on efficiency gains to their customers. Instead, according to them, they earn 
increased monopoly rent and therefore offer lower deposit interest rates, which in turn lead to 
higher credit availability to their customers. Additionally, according to them, the deposit rates 
of banks that did not operate in the markets where such mergers took place change in the 
same direction. However, the deposit rates of the merged banks tend to fall by a greater 
percentage as they maintained. Park and Pennacchi (2007), suggests that large banks engaging 
in mergers and acquisitions tend to reduce their retail deposit rates. Hannan and Prager (2004) 
indicate that large banks offer lower deposit interest rates than smaller banks in the same 
market and that when the size of the organization is fixed or controlled, banks operating in 
many local banking markets tend to set lower deposit interest rates than those operating in 
fewer markets. 
The effects of bank mergers on bank loan spreads have also been investigated by several 
scholars although we shall review very few of these literatures. Berger and Udell (1996), 
suggest that significant negative relationship exists between bank assets and bank lending to 
small businesses implying that as bank assets increase, the propensities to supply loans to 
small businesses decrease. However, the study discovers non-significant positive relationship 
between bank loans and small business lending. In this case, banks with relatively low assets 
are likely to increase their loans to small businesses. As it affects external effect, which 
considers how other non-consolidating banks in the same local markets response to mergers 
and acquisitions, the scholars found significant positive relationship between changes in bank 
sizes and external lending to small businesses. This shows that as banks drop their profitable 
small businesses loans due to increases in bank sizes occasioned by consolidation, other non- 
bank lenders in the same local market are likely to react by picking up such loans. The 
external effect therefore, tends to increase small business lending by other banks in the same 
local market that are not involved in mergers and acquisitions. The other banks that are non- 
involved according to Berger et al (1998), may pick up the profitable loans that are dropped 
by the merging institutions, or otherwise have a dynamic reaction that increases their small 
business supply. The scholars conclude by maintaining that the effect of bank mergers and 
acquisitions are complex with several offsetting static and dynamic effects. From the work of 
Peek and Eric (1997), large institutions allocate small amount of their risk assets to small 
businesses. The scholars are of the opinion that banking consolidations are not just about the 
growth in bank size. Some other issues according to them matter. Small banks according to 
them cannot just look away from the small business loan supplies since such institutions are 
generally limited to small loans and cannot make large business because of legal lending 
limits and diversification problem. 
Bank consolidation effect has also been investigated in respect to consolidated banks’ attitude 
to risk. De Nicolo et al (2003), shed light on this issue as they enquire if bank mergers can 
provide differential incentives for bank’s risk-taking. Their result shows that consolidations 
may result in diversification gains, which may decrease substantially bank risk exposure. Of 
course, reduction in bank risk entails more confidence on the borrowers thereby leading to 
higher credit availabilities to borrowers. However, on the other hand according to them, 
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consolidations may as well allow banks to experience increase in risk exposure thereby 
leading to smaller risk asset creation by the consolidating institutions. Craig  and Santos 
(1997) also examine the organics of risk effects caused by bank consolidations in the US. 
They found that the post-acquisition risk of newly formed banking organizations is 
substantially low indicating that bank consolidation could produce less risky organizations 
with higher propensity to create risk assets. This implies therefore that diversification gains 
can be one of the motives for merging. A diversified firm would likely be less risk averse, 
which would result in more credit availability to borrowers 
Survey of bankers involved in mergers and acquisitions indicated that Market Share has not 
been an important motivation for most bank mergers and acquisitions. Kolari and Zardkoohi 
(2011) found this as shown in Prompitak (2009). The result of their work shows that while 
market share has not been an important factor, gaining entry into a new market, achieving 
higher operating efficiency, and profitability were important factors. From the study, many 
respondents reported an increase in small business loans and medium business loans because 
of their mergers or acquisitions while less than 10% of the respondent reported a decrease in 
their large business loans because of a structural change. In addition, according  to their 
survey, fewer than 10% of the respondents reported an increase in their large business loans. 
From these literatures, it is evident that consolidation affects the way banks behave in relation 
to lending to small business borrowers. However, there is far less evidence on the role micro- 
financial institutions are playing as banks change their lending decision. This no doubt is a 
gap in literature. By filling this gap, this study has contributed significantly to literatures. 
 Methodology 
We employed cross-sectional research designs in this study. Therefore, we used historical 
secondary data, a cross section of 2000-2010 of 845 banks. The population of the study 
comprises 821 microfinance banks and 24 commercial banks. Using a purposive sampling 
technique, we selected the entire population for study as all the 24 commercial banks were 
involved in the N25billion minimum bank recapitalization processes. Likewise, the 821 
micro-finance banks were the ones that emerged successfully after the N20million or 
N1billion minimum recapitalization mandate as prescribed for them by CBN. The cross- 
sectional period under study was divided into two. Section 1 denotes the period between 2000 
and 2004, which constitutes a five-year premerger period. The second section denotes the 
period between 2005 and 2010, which is a six-year post merger periods in Nigeria. To capture 
the time effect, we created dummy variable f following Prompitak (2009), which takes the 
value one for post merger periods and zero for the period merger did not take place. The 
periods under consideration cover at least six-year post-consolidation period. Major banking 
consolidation specifically took place in 2005. Researchers indicate that banking restructuring 
after mergers and acquisitions occurs within the space of at least three years. By choosing six 
years post-consolidation gestation period, we are able to capture both short and long run 
restructuring and external effects. 
 Data Analysis Technique 
We analyzed the secondary data collected by multivariate regression analysis technique with 
the aid of Predictive Analytic Software (PASW). We also presented and analyzed data by 
tables and graphs and made inferences from descriptive statistics. For regression analysis to 
be unbiased and genuine, certain assumptions must be satisfied especially as it concerns 
multiple regressions. In the first place, the data obtained for the purpose of regression analysis 
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must follow a normal distribution. Moreover, the independent variable data must also have a 
linear relationship with dependent variable. In this work, we test for normality using Shapiro- 
Wilks’ Test procedure. With Shapiro-Wilks’ statistics, we were able to test the  null 
hypothesis that the data are normally distributed. The p-value of greater than 0.05 indicates 
the presence of normality and linearity. Apart from the use of Shapiro-Wilks’ statistic, we 
also employed skewness to analyze the normality of the data. Skewness of greater than 1.0 
indicates the data are highly tilted and may not be fit for regression analysis, while skewness 
between 1 and 0, provides evidence that the data at question are suitable for regression 
analysis. However, for purpose of enhancing linearity, and normality as well, we transformed 
most of the data by natural logarithm. We postulated four hypotheses in this study to capture 
the directions as market structures changes. We tested them using f-ratio, and Wilks’ lambda, 
at 5% significant value. We also tested the fitness of the model we formulated using Partial 
Eta Square and Wilks’ lambda. 
 An Econometric Model 
Earlier theoretical expositions on the ways consolidation affects banking behavior maintain 
that the effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on bank lending can either be dynamic 
and/or static. Based on this, we model for restructuring dynamic effects using a refined 
Monti-Klein bank lending model. First, the traditional Monti-Klein is formulated for multiple 
regression analysis. This means one dependent variable is regressed against two or more 
dependent variables. In our modified model, we used the foundation to model multivariate 
effect, which means that two or more dependent variables are regressed simultaneously for 
their contemporaneous effects. Second, since the traditional Monti-Klein bank lending model 
views the banking firm in a static setting where demands for deposits and supply of loans 
simultaneously clear both markets (Klein, 1971; Monti 1972), we refined it following other 
researchers to fix the static nature of the model. In the original model, there is an inherent 
problem over how to separate decisions about loans and deposits in the bank optimization of 
the basic Monti-Klein model in a dynamic setting (Prompitak, 2009). However, this 
shortcoming as indicated by scholars can be overcome by the introduction of additional 
suppositions such as risk, size, equity characteristics, and market share into the model. Our 
model followed suit by reforming the traditional Monti-Klein Model by incorporating these 
variables. However, as already indicated above while Monti-Klein model is multinomial, we 
applied multivariate and separated the models into four separate models for ease of analysis. 
We assumed that increase or decrease in banks’ small business loans has the explanation for 
increase or decrease in MFBs’ loans. In this way, we establish our trade-off or substitution 
relationship between the loans in a dynamic market structures. Therefore, under the 
assumption of an imperfectly competitive banking market, modified Monti-Klein model can 
be very suitable for modeling the restructuring co-impacts of changing market structures on 
bank and MFBs loans to small businesses. Notably, bank mergers and acquisitions have 
always been explained by such metrics such as bank size, bank deposits, and bank equity and 
bank market shares (Berger, 1998, Prompitak (2009); Samolyx and Avery, (2000), Emeni and 
Okafor (2008). Changes in these variables have special influences on bank lending 
propensities. This indicates that significant relationship can exist between them. For the 
purpose of this study, we formulated four models based on the traditional Monti-Klein Model 
adjusted in accordance with our postulations. In these models as shown below, the researcher 
considers how the effects of changes in these explanatory variables can translate into decrease 
or increase in both commercial and microfinance bank loans to small businesses. Therefore, 
these relationships are expressed thus: 
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M1it,C1it=α1m,c+β1tm,cBZit* ∑ 𝑭𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏  ………………………………………..…….(1) 
 
M2it,C2it=α2m,c+β2tm,cEQit* ∑ 𝑭𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏  ………………………………………….….(2) 
 
M3it,C3it=α3m,c+β3tm,cDEPit *  ∑ 𝑭𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏  …………….……………………………..(3) 
 
M4it,C4it=α4m,c+β4tm,cMS4it *  ∑ 𝑭𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏 …………………………………………..(4) 
 
 
Where 
i=1...n is the number of cross-sectional units and t=1...t is the number of time period 
β1m,c, β2m,c,  β3m,c and β4m,c are the Kx1 vectors of coefficients on the explanatory  variables-BZ, 
EQ, DEP and MS4 - respectively as related to M and C. 
Fi is a 1xP vector of the time-invariant observables, which varies only between individuals. It 
takes value 1 for the post merger period and 0 otherwise. It is a merger effect interaction with 
banks’ specific characteristics. αm,ci is the unobservable individual level effects. This is 
included to take care of other variables that can affect loans to small businesses, which have 
been omitted for ease of analysis. It also takes care of the stochastic error. 
M is an observable dependent variable, which stands for micro-finance bank loans. It 
measures how changes in mergers and acquisitions explanatory variables affect the quantity 
of the loans MFBs make available to borrowers. It is scaled in logarithm for linearity 
purposes. 
C is also an observable dependent variable that measures the quantity of loans supplied to 
small businesses by commercial banks within the period under survey. It is also scaled in 
logarithm. 
BZ is the 1xK vector of independent variable-bank size, which varies between individuals and 
over time. We defined Bank size in terms of bank gross assets and scaled it in logarithm. It is 
featured so that we can determine how their variations due to banking consolidation affect 
their propensity to supply credit to small businesses and how the MFBs respond to these 
changes in their propensity to supply small credits. The assumption here is that since both 
operate in the same local market, fall in the small business loans by commercial banks  is 
likely to be the only factor that would explain subsequent rise in loans to small businesses by 
MFBs all things being equal. Otherwise, the loans dropped by the consolidating banks would 
be left unpicked and the MFBs loans to small businesses remain proportionally constant. 
EQ is the 1xK vector of independent variable-bank Equity, which also varies between 
individuals and over time. As an independent variable, it is featured to measure how changes 
in bank financial characteristics of merged banks affect bank lending to small businesses both 
as it affects commercial banking where the direct effect is felt and the MFBs where the 
indirect effects is determined. It is scaled in terms of bank gross asset. That is, EQ is the ratio 
of equity to gross assets expressed in percentage. 
DEP is total bank deposits in the banking sector, which as well varies between individuals 
and over time. It is scaled in logarithm. It is featured to measure changes in total market 
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deposit demand in relation to small business assets creation by both the consolidated 
commercial banks and MFBs loans to their customers. 
MS4 is a bank market share. It is the 1xK vector of market concentration index, which varies 
between individuals and over time. As an independent variable, it measures banking 
concentration ratio of four big banks. Concentration ratio is the ratio of individual bank assets 
to total gross assets of banks. It determines the market share of banks in the domestic banking 
market setting. Hence, it is used in order to feature the bank’s market structure, or in other 
words, the competitive environment in which the banks operates (Prompitak, 2009). The data 
for the estimation of this index is obtained from the CBN and the banks’ financial statement. 
The four banks selected for the purpose of this calculation are First Bank of Nigeria Plc, 
Zenith Bank, UBA and GTB that control about 50% of the industry’s asset base as at 2009. 
As of 2012, the top firms’ assets constitute about 70% of the entire industry’s gross assets. To 
calculate the concentration ratio, we measure the individual market shares of the selected 
banks. Thus, we apply the formula: ms4 ∑4 Ci, Ci= the concentration ratio of each  selected 
top bank= individual assets/ total industry assets, i=1,…4 N= the number of the banks =4, ∑= 
summation symbol. 
F is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for post merger periods and 0 for pre-merger 
periods. It is featured to capture the time effects. In our analysis, we separated the interaction, 
since we have switched off the pre-merger period by assigning zero to it. Hence, the effect we 
got is post-merger effects as caused by the influence of consolidations. 
4.1 Data Presentation and Empirical Results Analysis 
The data are presented in the table 1 below. We have to screen the data as presented in table 3 
in order to determine how normal and linear are the data obtained for the purpose of the 
regression analysis. Normality and linearity of the data were tested with Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistics and skewness. The data are normal if the Shapiro-Wilk statistics indicate 
probabilities greater than 0.05. 
Table 1.0: The Raw Data Obtained 
 
Year BAC4 TBDEP TBA SBLOANS EQUITY MFBL 
2010 8361953 9784542 17331559 12550 3829448 52867.50 
2009 8828001 9150037 17522858 16366 2961363 58215.66 
2008 5951779 7960166 15919559 13512 2642647 
42753.06 
2007 3810984 5001470 10981693 41100 1625291 22850.20 
2006 2426729 3245156 7172932 25713 1061594 16450.20 
2005 1236126 2036089 4515117 50672 717903.7 
28504.80 
2004 897337 1661482 3753277 54981 412860.6 11353.80 
2003 640546 1337296 3047856 90176 536422.7 9954.80 
2002 480409 1157111 2766880 82368 500805.3 4310.90 
2001 261303 947182 2247039 52428 364020.5 1314.00 
Source: Author: Data Used from CBN Statistical Bulletin NB: Figures in millions 
 
TBDEP = Total Bank Deposit, TBA =Total Bank Asset, SBLOANS= Small Business Loans BAC4= Bank 
Assets Concentration Ratio of 4 topmost banks, EQUITY= total shareholders fund, MFBL=  Micro-Finance 
Bank Loans. 
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Table 2: Operation Measure of the Variables for Regression Analysis 
 
BZ C DEP EQ MS4 M 
7.238838 4.098654 
6.990541 
22.09523 48.25 
4.72 
7.243605 4.213956 
6.961423 
16.9 50.38 
4.77 
7.201931 4.130726 
6.900922 
16.6 37.39 
4.63 
7.040669 4.613846 
6.699098 
14.8 34.7 
4.36 
6.855697 4.410165 
6.511236 
14.8 33.83 
4.22 
6.654669 4.704773 
6.308797 
15.9 27.38 
4.45 
6.574411 4.740214 
6.220496 
11 23.91 
4.06 
6.483994 4.955093 
6.126228 
17.6 21.02 
4 
6.44199 4.915761 
6.063375 
18.1 17.36 
3.63 
6.351611 4.719567 
5.976433 
16.20001 11.63 
3.12 
Source: CBN reports of various years, CBN statistical Bulletins and Author computations. 
 
BZ = Bank Size (Log10 Gross Assets), C= Commercial Bank Loans to small Businesses (Log10CBLSB), 
DEP=Bank Deposits (Log10BDEPOSIT), EQ = Bank Equity (Ratio bank Equity to gross asset), MS=Market 
Share 
 
Table 3: Data Screening 
 
Tests of Normality  
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk  
 Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. Skewness 
BZ .169 10 .200
*
 .887 10 .156 0.126 
DEP .176 10 .200
*
 .884 10 .144 0.268 
C .187 10 .200
*
 .905 10 .250 -0.332 
MS4 .117 10 .200
*
 .964 10 .827 0.226 
EQ .175 10 .200
*
 .907 10 .260 0.320 
M .152 10 .200
*
 .921 10 .368 -0.996 
Source: Author using PASW 
In table 3, the results of the tests are presented. The tests indicate data normality and linearity 
of the variables. The Shapiro-Wilk test statistic for BZ equals 0.887 with the associated 
probability of 0.156. Since the p-value is greater than the 0.05 critical values, we conclude the 
data are normally distributed are fit for regression analysis. Likewise, the Shapiro-Wilk test 
statistics for DEP, C, MS4, EQ, M are 0.176, 0.187, 0.117, 0.175, 0.152 respectively all 
indicate the data were normally distributed. Their associated probabilities-0.144, 0.250, 0.827, 
0.260 and 0.368 were greater than the 5% critical value. The Shapiro-Wilk statistics are 
confirmed by the small values of skewness. Skewness of less than 1 shows normality of the 
data. 
Multivariate Regression Results and Interpretation 
The empirical results are presented in the tables below. The results were analyzed based on 
the specific objectives of the study in which case the researcher is faced with the task of 
determining the extent fall in bank loans to small businesses due to changes in bank size of 
merged commercial banks affect microfinance bank lending. We also ascertain the extent 
changes in bank equity affect commercial and microfinance bank propensity to supply loans 
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to small businesses. Likewise, the researcher determines the extent fall in bank loans because 
of changes in bank deposit and market shares of emerging mega commercial banks affect 
commercial and microfinance bank loans to small businesses. We shall begin the 
interpretation from table 4. 
Table 4: The Extent Fall In Bank Loan To Small Businesses Due To Changes In Bank 
Size Of Merged Commercial Banks Affects Microfinance Bank Lending. 
Parameter Estimates 
Dep 
end 
ent 
Vari 
able 
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
T Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Partial 
Eta 
Square 
d 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
C αc 10.112 1.746 5.792 .001 5.984 14.241 .827 
F 9.708 
E-5 
.184 .001 1.000 -.434 .435 .000 
BZ -.817 .270 -3.027 .019 -1.455 -.179 .567 
M αm -2.471 3.096 -.798 .451 -9.792 4.849 .083 
F .273 .326 .838 .430 -.497 1.043 .091 
BZ .955 .479 1.996 .086 -.176 2.087 .363 
Source: Author using PASW; M1it,C1it= -2.471m, 10.112c  +(0.955m   -.817c)BZit + (0.273 m, , 
9.708c)F) 
Table 4 as displayed above shows that increase in bank gross assets due to bank mergers and 
acquisitions reduce credit banks supply to small business borrowers. As bank size in terms of 
gross assets increases by 1%, loans to small businesses fall by 0.817%. The fall in credit 
supply is significant at 5%. Other factors held constant, 56% of fall in bank loans is explained 
by changes in bank sizes. This implies that only 44% is accounted for by other factors. 
However, micro-finance banks are responding positively to falls in the banks’ small credits. 
The fall in small credits supply by banks increases small credit supply by commercial banks. 
0.817% fall in bank loan due to 1% increase in banks’ gross assets, brings about 0.955% 
increases in microfinance bank loans to small businesses. Although this is not significant at 
5% level, it shows total offsetting effect. Bank mergers and acquisitions explain up to 36.3% 
of increase in micro-finance bank loans. This result indicates micro-finance banks have an 
essential role to play in an economy. Their lending products constitute substitutes to 
commercial banks’. The graph below clearly depicts this relationship. As the bank  gross 
assets rises, bank loans to small businesses falls. At first, the curve sharply rises indicating 
positive slope. This period of positive rise was pre- acquisitions period. Then suddenly, the 
curve began to nosedive. This nose diving period began after mergers between banks and it 
depicts negative relationship between the variables. 
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Figure1: Graph showing bank loans to small Businesses and changes in banks gross assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author; Data Used are from table 1 in the appendix 1; BZ= Bank Size; C 
=Commercial Bank Loan To Small Business Borrowers. 
The exact picture of the relationship between bank size and micro-finance bank loans is 
presented in the figure 2 below. The graph shows strong positive relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. As the banking sector grows in size, the non-bank credit 
to small borrowers increases. 
Figure 2: Bank size and micro-finance bank loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author; Data Used from CBN Bulletin as Shown in Table 1 in Appendix 1; BZ= 
Bank Size; M=Micro-Finance Bank Loans Small Credit Users. 
Testing Hypothesis 1 
We use the statistics as shown in table 4.1 below to test the hypothesis 1 that changes in bank 
size and consequential fall in commercial bank loans do not significantly affect microfinance 
bank loans to small businesses. 
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Table 4.1: Test Statistics For Hypothesis 1 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
BZ Pillai's Trace .757 9.335 2.000 6.000 .014 .757 
Wilks' Lambda .243 9.335 2.000 6.000 .014 .757 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
3.112 9.335 2.000 6.000 .014 .757 
Source: Author using PASW 
The null hypothesis is rejected since the significant value for each of the statistics shows 
1.4%, which is less than 5% critical value. The alternative that Changes in bank size and 
consequential fall in commercial bank loans do significantly affect microfinance bank loans to 
small businesses is accepted. The model M1it,C1it= -2.471m, 10.112c +(0.955m -.817c)BZit + 
(0.273 m, , 9.708c)F is therefore efficient and fits our data well. 
Table 5 below presents the result of changes in equity condition of banking firm market 
structures and co-impact on both bank and MFBs loans to small businesses. 
Table 5: The Extent of the Effects Changes in Bank Equity on Commercial Bank and 
Microfinance Bank Loans to Small Businesses 
 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Depe 
ndent 
Varia 
ble 
Parameter B Std. Error T Sig. 95% Confidence Interval Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Lower Bound Upper 
Bound 
C αc 8.780 1.369 6.412 .000 5.542 12.019 .855 
F -.044 .179 -.249 .810 -.467 .378 .009 
EQ -.699 .242 -2.887 .023 -1.271 -.126 .544 
M αm -.407 2.522 -.161 .876 -6.371 5.556 .004 
F .380 .329 1.155 .286 -.398 1.157 .160 
EQ .727 .446 1.632 .147 -.326 1.781 .276 
Source: Author using PASW M2it,C2it=-0.407m, 8.780c+(0.727m, -.699c)EQit +(0.380m, -0.044c )F 
As indicated in table 5 above, increase in bank equity due to bank mergers and acquisitions 
reduces credit banks supply to small business borrowers. Based on the result, increase in 
shareholders’ funds lowers banks’ propensity to supply small credits to borrowers.  When 
bank equity increases by 1%, loans to small businesses fall by 0.699%. Statistically, the fall is 
significant at 5%. Partial Eta Square indicates that 54.4% of this fall can be explained by 
changes in bank equity other factors held constant. With this, it is clear that only 45.6% is 
accounted for by other factors. However, micro-finance banks’ propensities have increased 
due largely to the consolidation exercise. They are therefore, responding positively to falls in 
the banks’ small credits. The fall in small credits supply by banks increases small credit 
supply by commercial banks. For any 0.699% fall in bank loans due to 1% increase in bank 
equity micro-finance banks increase their loans by 0.727%. This is not significant at 5% level, 
but it shows total offsetting effects. Bank mergers and acquisitions account for up to 27.6% of 
increase  in  micro-finance  bank  loans.  This  result  indicates  micro-finance  banks  have an 
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essential role to play in an economy. Their lending products constitute substitutes to 
commercial banks’. 
Testing Hypothesis 2 
We use the statistics displayed in the table 5.1 below to test hypothesis 2. 
Table 5.1: Test Statistics for Hypothesis 2 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
EQ Pillai's Trace .673 6.180 2.000 6.000 .035 .673 
Wilks' Lambda .327 6.180 2.000 6.000 .035 .673 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
2.060 6.180 2.000 6.000 .035 .673 
Source: Author using PASW 
The Hypothesis 2 that changes in bank equity and consequential fall in commercial bank 
loans do not significantly affect microfinance bank loans to small businesses is rejected 
because the significant values for each of the statistics show 3.5%, which is less than 5% 
critical value. Therefore, the null hypothesis that Changes in bank equity and consequential 
fall in commercial bank loans do not significantly affect microfinance bank loans to small 
businesses is rejected. The alternative that Changes in bank equity and consequential fall in 
commercial bank loans do significantly affect microfinance bank loans to small businesses is 
accepted. The model-M2it,C2it=-0.407m, 8.780c+(0.727m, -.699c)EQit +(0.380m, -0.044c )F- in 
respect of this hypothesis is therefore good. 
In relation to changes in deposit market demand due to changing market structures and their 
co-impact on both bank and microfinance loans to small business borrowers, we present table 
6 below. 
Table 6: The Extent of the Effects Changes in Bank Deposit on Commercial Bank and 
Microfinance Bank Loans to Small Businesses 
Parameter Estimates 
Depe 
nden 
t 
Vari 
able 
Parameter B Std. Error T Sig. 95% Confidence Interval Partial Eta 
Squared Lower Bound Upper 
Bound 
C αc 9.258 1.327 6.975 .000 6.119 12.396 .874 
F -.011 .166 -.068 .948 -.403 .381 .001 
DEP -.725 .217 -3.339 .012 -1.239 -.212 .614 
M αM -1.030 2.560 -.403 .699 -7.083 5.022 .023 
F .332 .320 1.039 .333 -.424 1.088 .134 
DEP .776 .419 1.851 .107 -.215 1.766 .329 
Source:    Author    using   PASW    Mit,Cit=       9.258c     -1.030m,+(0.776m,     -.725c)DEPit+(0.332   m,,    -.011c)Fi 
…………….(3) 
 
The result shows that increases in bank deposits due to bank mergers and acquisitions as well 
reduce credit commercial banks supply to small business borrowers. As bank deposit 
increases by 1% loans to small businesses fall by 0.725%. The fall in credit supply is not 
significant at 5%. Other factors held constant, 61.4% of fall in bank loans is explained by 
changes in bank deposits. This implies that only 38.6% is accounted for by other factors.  The 
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time effects indicate that in pre-merger periods, banks lend more to small business. However, 
micro-finance banks are responding positively to falls in the commercial banks’ small credits. 
The fall in small credits supply by banks, increases small credit supply by MFBs. Based on 
the result, 0.725% fall in bank loan due to 1% increase in banks’ gross assets, brings about 
0.776% increases in microfinance bank loans to small businesses. Although this is not 
significant at 5% level, it shows total offsetting effects. Bank mergers and  acquisitions 
explain up to 32.9% of increase in micro-finance bank loans. 
Test of Hypothesis 3 
We test this hypothesis using the test statistics as shown in in table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: Test Statistics For Hypothesis 3 
Multivariate Tests
b
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
DEP Pillai's Trace .773 10.219 2.000 6.000 .012 .773 
Wilks' Lambda .227 10.219 2.000 6.000 .012 .773 
Hotelling's Trace 3.406 10.219 2.000 6.000 .012 .773 
Source: Author using PASW 
 
Based on the above information, the null hypothesis that fall in commercial bank loans to 
small businesses due to changes in bank deposits of merged banks does not bring about 
significant increase in microfinance bank loans to small businesses is also rejected. This is 
since the significant values for each of the statistics show 0.012, which is less than 0.05 
critical values. Therefore, the alternative that fall in commercial bank loans to small 
businesses due to changes in bank deposits of merged banks bring about significant increase 
in microfinance bank loans to small businesses is accepted. In this regard, the model is fit 
thus: Mit,Cit=  9.258c -1.030m,+(0.776m, -.725c)DEPit+(0.332 m,, -.011c)Fi. 
Finally, we analyze the relationship between changing market share or concentration ratio, 
banks’ small business loan and MFBs loans to borrowers. The result is presented in table 7 
below. 
Table 7: The Extent of the Effects Changes in Bank Market Share on Commercial Bank 
and Microfinance Bank Loans to Small Businesses 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Dep 
ende 
nt 
Vari 
able 
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
T Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
C αc 5.162 .173 29.820 .000 4.752 5.571 .992 
F -.111 .199 -.561 .593 -.581 .358 .043 
MS4 -.018 .008 -2.211 .063 -.037 .001 .411 
M αm 3.154 .225 13.989 .000 2.621 3.687 .965 
F .226 .259 .872 .412 -.386 .837 .098 
MS .030 .010 2.824 .026 .005 .054 .532 
Source:  Author  using  PASW;  M4it,C4it=5.162c   +3.154m   -0.018c,+0.030m   MSit   +0.226  m    - 
.111cF4i . 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.13, 2015 
www.iiste.org 
210 
 
 
 
The result indicates that increase in bank market share due to changing market structures 
caused by bank mergers and acquisitions reduces credit banks supply to small business 
borrowers. Based on the result, increase in the asset concentration ratio lowers commercial 
banks’ propensity to supply small credits to borrowers. When bank market share increases by 
1% loans to small businesses fall by 0.018%. Statistically, the fall is not significant at 5% 
level. Partial Eta Square indicates that 41.3% of this fall can be explained by changes in bank 
market share. However, micro-finance banks’ propensities have increased due largely to the 
consolidation exercise. They are therefore, responding positively to falls in the banks’ small 
credits. The fall in small credits supply by banks increases small credit supply by MFBs. 
0.018% fall in bank loans due to 1% increase in bank market share, micro-finance banks 
increase their loans by 0.03%. This is significant at 5% level, as p-value equals 2.6%.  It 
shows total offsetting of the negative effects. The forces associated with bank mergers and 
acquisitions explain 53.2% of the increase in micro-finance bank loans. 
Test of Hypothesis 4 
We use the statistics displayed in table 7.1 to test hypothesis 4. 
Table 7.1: Test Statistics for Hypothesis 4 
Effec 
t 
 Value F Hypothes 
is df 
Error df Sig. Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
MS4 Pillai's Trace .764 9.735 2.000 6.000 .013 .764 
Wilks' Lambda .236 9.735 2.000 6.000 .013 .764 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
3.245 9.735 2.000 6.000 .013 .764 
Source: Author using PASW 
As the table shows, the hypothesis 4 that fall in commercial bank loans to small businesses 
due to changes in bank market shares of merged banks does not bring significant increase in 
microfinance bank loans to small businesses is rejected. This is since the significant values for 
each of the statistics show 0.013, which is less than 0.05 critical values. Therefore, the 
alternative that fall in commercial bank loans to small businesses due to changes in bank 
market shares of merged banks brings significant increase in microfinance bank loans to small 
businesses is accepted. The model in respect of this postulate is perfectly fit thus: 
M4it,C4it=5.162c +3.154m -0.018c,+0.030m MS4it +0.226 m -.111cF4i. The hypotheses tested 
above prove the facts that fall in commercial bank loans is being offset by increase in 
microfinance bank loans to small firms. According to Berger et al (1998), the external effect, 
which is the reactions of the other banks in the local markets seems to be quite strong and 
positive, offsetting much if not all of the reductions in supply of small business lending by the 
consolidating institutions. These other banks according to them, may pick up profitable loans 
that are dropped by merging institutions, or otherwise have a dynamic reaction that increases 
their small business supply. These assertions are fully supported by the results of the test. The 
overall results indicate that micro-finance banks play significant substitution risk-asset 
creation roles in a dynamic banking market structures. 
4.1.3 Conclusion and recommendations 
Changing market structures usually due to bank mergers and acquisitions have significant 
effects on small business lending by both the banks and micro-finance banks. As bank sizes 
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increase, bank loans to small businesses decreases. However, this fall in commercial bank 
loans is taken care of by the rising propensity of micro-finance banks to lend. Therefore, the 
equilibrium state of small business loan supply and demand, which would have  been 
disrupted by the changing values of bank financial characteristics are being maintained by the 
rising small bank loans to small businesses. Likewise, changing market structures caused by 
bank mergers and acquisition as explained by the changing bank deposits bring  about 
decrease in commercial bank loans to small business borrowers. However, the fall is largely 
offset by consequential rise in Micro-Finance Bank loans to smalls businesses. Other market 
and consolidations explanatory variables as well bring about fall in small credit creation by 
commercial banks. However, micro-finance banks respond positively to such fall in small 
credits. Micro-finance banks are playing significant new role in Nigerian banking sector, 
which as we have discovered involves offsetting of negative effects of bank consolidation on 
credit availabilities to small businesses in Nigerian. This new rose deserves much attention of 
the policy makers. We recommend that policies towards encouraging Micro-finance banks in 
Nigeria or elsewhere should be put in place such as lifting the maximum lending of MFBs 
from N0.5million to N1million or above. 
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